Articles on OPEN ACCESS
"University libraries as active agents for change. The BitViews Project: how University librarians can turn all journals green and clear the path to open science", published 14 Jul 2021,
41st Annual IATUL Conference 2021, Porto, Portugal, 13-15 July 2021. "How to achieve short-term green open access and long-term radical reform of scholarly communication: The BitViews Project as a test case", ELPUB 2020 24rd edition of the International Conference on Electronic Publishing, Apr 2020, Doha, Qatar.
"What flowers can bloom in a green open access landscape? Imaging a future with BitViews" , 14 Aug 2020, ITM Web of Conferences: International Conference on ICT enhanced Social Sciences and Humanities (ICTeSSH 2020). Ivanović, D. (ed.).
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Abstract: There can be no open science without Open Access (OA). This paper is a call to arms to individual University librarians to make a decisive move towards open access. The short-term objective of OA is defined as the immediate, cost-free, online access to the content of all peer reviewed scientific, medical, and scholarly articles. This amounts to unrestricted access to the author’s approved manuscripts (AAMs) deposited in institutional and other repositories. Even in the current academic publishing ecosystem, largely directed and managed by a few oligopolistic commercial publishers, 80% of peer reviewed articles can be deposited as AAMs, but only a small minority of researchers choose to do so. The reason for this failure is that currently there are no individual incentives for researchers to promote their AAMs, as the main currency of academic recognition and esteem (the citation count) resides with published articles. The author has described elsewhere how an open-source blockchain application (BitViews) can collect, validate, and disseminate at minimal cost online usage data of all AAMs available on institutional repositories. The resulting public ledger of usage data can be used to arrange discipline-specific non-citation research impact measures thereby providing the incentive for more authors to deposit their AAMs in a virtuous circle. The green OA thus achieved allows researchers in the global South to enter scholarly communication not only as consumers but also as producers of peer-reviewed knowledge. BitViews Project allows individual university libraries to be catalysts for change. The paper explains how a novel application of game theory (conditional crowdfunding) will empower individual libraries to spread the relatively miniscule costs of setting up BitViews using a two-stage mechanism that minimises free-riding and offers a no-risk opportunity to libraries to deploy their institutional repositories not just as stores of information, but as active tools to achieve open access.
Abstract: The Open Access movement has reached adulthood, but not maturity: fewer than one-third of newly-published peer-reviewed articles are available open access (OA) and progress widening OA has stalled. Scores of uncoordinated initiatives try to achieve universal OA, but academic journal
publishing is still dominated by a handful of powerful commercial publishers. Individual authors show little interest in OA and indeed have to be mandated (see the UK REF or Plan S) to release their research on OA. The BitViews Project is a low-cost, no-risk, high-return initiative to turn all academic journals «green» through a combination of blockchain technology, provision of appropriate incentives to authors, and a new crowdfunding mechanism. The project is predicated on the active participation of individual libraries taking direct action. The paper will provide an interim report on the progress of the project and an account of how libraries and their various associations (both in the global South and in the global North) have reacted to the project. The concluding section of the paper sketches a possible direction for academic journal publishing in the near future. Huge savings and increased efficiency can flow to the academy from finally dissolving its current one-sided contract with publishers and from reclaiming control of the peer-review process. Practical and incentive-based suggestions are proposed for the transition from publisher-owned to academy-owned peer review. Abstract: BitViews is a blockchain application that collects, validates, and aggregates worldwide online usage data of author’s approved manuscripts (AAMs) deposited in Open Access Institutional Repositories. It creates a free public ledger of usage events that allows anyone to see which research outputs have been accessed, where, and when, thus providing the raw material to construct discipline- and region-specific non-citation based measures of research impact. BitViews’ short-term implications include: (i) The re-alignment of journal impact measures (from citations to usage); (ii) Changed patterns in the production of research articles (towards high- usage topics); (iii) Creation of new networks of research collaboration; (iv) Enhanced opportunity for open data sharing.
BitViews’ long-term effects are transformative. Because BitViews promotes the “unbundling” of AAMs from published articles, it endows AAMs with independent value. Two disruptive consequences follow: the very concept of APCs is undermined and the conditions are created for the academy to regain ownership of peer review. Relegating commercial publishers to the role of providers of post-AAM services, huge resources will be released. As soon as AAMs are de‐ coupled from articles, the same process and infrastructure can be applied to research monographs, thereby completing the cycle of Open Access to the whole production of knowledge. |
"The fundamental problem blocking open access and how to overcome it: the BitViews project", (joint with C. Lamanna) Insights: the UKSG Journal, 20 Nov. 2019.
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Abstract: In our view the fundamental obstacle to open access (OA) is the lack of any incentive-based mechanism that unbundles authors’ accepted manuscripts (AMs) from articles (VoRs). The former can be seen as the public good that ought to be openly accessible, whereas the latter is owned by publishers and rightly paywall-restricted. We propose one such mechanism to overcome this obstacle: BitViews. BitViews is a blockchain-based application that aims to revolutionize the OA publishing ecosystem. Currently, the main academic currency of value is the citation. There have been attempts in the past to create a second currency whose measure is the online usage of research materials (e.g., PIRUS). However, these have failed due to two problems. Firstly, it has been impossible to find a single agency willing to co-ordinate and fund the validation and collation of global online usage data. Secondly, online usage metrics have lacked transparency in how they filter non-human online activity. BitViews is a novel solution which uses blockchain technology to bypass both problems: online AM usage will be recorded on a public, distributed ledger, obviating the need for a central responsible agency, and the rules governing activity-filtering will be part of the open-source BitViews blockchain application, creating complete transparency. Once online AM usage has measurable value, researchers will be incentivized to promote and disseminate AMs. This will fundamentally re-orient the academic publishing ecosystem. A key feature of BitViews is that its success (or failure) is wholly and exclusively in the hands of the worldwide community of university and research libraries, as we suggest that it ought to be financed by conditional crowdfunding, whereby the actual financial commitment of each contributing library depends on the total amount raised. If the financing target is not reached, then all contributions are returned in full and if the target is over-fulfilled, then the surplus is returned pro rata.
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"BitView: Using Blockchain Technology to Validate and Diffuse Global Usage Data for Academic Publications", October 2018, (joint with C. Lamanna), in Dobreva M., Hinze A., Žumer M. (eds) Maturity and Innovation in Digital Libraries. ICADL 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11279. Springer, Cham.
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Abstract: We suggest that blockchain technology could be used to underpin a validated, reliable, and transparent usage metric for research outputs. Previous attempts to create online usage metrics have been unsuccessful largely because it has been difficult to co-ordinate agreement between all parties on the rules of data collection and the distribution of the workload of data synthesis and dissemination. Blockchain technology can be utilized to bypass this co-ordination problem. We propose the creation of a bibliometric blockchain (called BitView) which forms a decentralized ledger of the online usage of scholarly research outputs. By means of a worked example, we demonstrate how this blockchain could ensure that all parties adhere to the
same rules of data collection, and that the workload of data synthesis is distributed equitably. Moreover, we outline how public-private key cryptography could ensure that users’ data remains private while librarians, academics, publishers, and research funders retain open access to all the data they require. It is concluded that a usage metric underpinned by blockchain technology may lead to a richer and healthier ecosystem in which publishers and academics are incentivized to widen access to their research. |
economics articles
Abstract: The paper shows that, whenever the completion of a research
project requires the overcoming of more than one research obstacle, then
Research Joint Ventures enjoy an intrinsic advantage relative to independent
firms. This advantage, which has hitherto escaped attention in the RJV
literature, relates to the RJV’s ability to organize research more efficiently
than independent firms. The fact that RJVs can be both more profitable and
yield higher expected net welfare than independent firms is surprising
because it is derived from a model in which RJVs do not optimize over
R&D investment. The paper exploits a basic result in systems reliability
theory to establish the organizational superiority of RJVs.
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"Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures", B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 2013 (1), pp. 59-77.
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"Mixed oligopoly, public firm behavior, and free private entry", Economics Letters , 2012, (117), pp. 767-769 (with John Bennett)
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Abstract: We analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms, assuming that a public firm maximizes an increasing function of output, subject to a break-even constraint. We establish an irrelevance result: whenever a mixed oligopoly is viable, then aggregate output, aggregate costs and welfare are the same with and without the public firm. However, replacing a viable mixed oligopoly with a public monopoly yields higher net welfare. Implications for privatization policy are suggested.
"The surprising benefits of a parallel universe", Managerial and Decision Economics, 2009, 30(2), pp. 109-117.
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Abstract: Suppose that the successful completion of a project requires performing n tasks, each of which has a probability of success p. The paper establishes under what conditions it may be profitable to engage in parallel multi-tasking, i.e. tackling each task by following two independent routes. It is found that for all n>1 parallel multi-tasking is profitable for a wide range of parameters when costs are linear and is always profitable for convex costs.
"Assessing the assessors or, the Research Assessment Exercise and the optimal organization of University research", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2008 (55(5)), pp. 637-653
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Abstract: The UK Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) is assessed as an incentive scheme affecting the allocation of research talent of varying ‘quality’ across departments. The ‘centres of excellence’ policy implicitly pursued through the RAE is an optimal allocation strategy only if all departments in all disciplines are of the generalist variety, i.e. each pursues a research path through all its stages. Conversely, the RAE-induced research allocation minimizes efficiency if applied to specialist departments, when resources are concentrated on one specific research obstacle. It is argued that the RAE should not take the organization of University research as exogenous, but rather should encourage specialization. All results are obtained by applying to University research concepts and solutions borrowed from the mathematical theory of systems reliability.
"Reversing the Keynesian Asymmetry", American Economic Review, (with John Bennett) , 2001 (91(5)), pp. 1556-1563.
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Abstract: Menu-cost models that provide a theoretical underpinning for the “Keynesian” assumption that nominal prices are more flexible upward than downward consider imperfectly competitive markets (monopoly, oligopoly, imperfect competition). Could a “quasi-competitive” industry (a Bertrand oligopoly with menu costs and free entry) reverse this asymmetry? We examine such a market structure and identify simple conditions that result in nominal price being more flexible downward than upward. Our analysis suggests that, in the presence of menu costs, the pattern of nominal price adjustment may be related to the form and extent of imperfect competition.
"To Infinity and no Further" (with G. Slomp), Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1997 (30(3)), pp. 561-63. A Rejoinder to Alexander Coram's Comment.
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"Hobbes, Harsanyi, and the Edge of the Abyss" (with G. Slomp), Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1996 (29(1)), pp.47-70.
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Abstract: We present a new game-theoretic interpretation of Hobbes’s state of nature that, unlike existing rational-choice models, questions the possibility of individually rational decision-making. We provide a general formulation of the two-player two-strategy game applied to the state of nature and we derive existing models as special cases. Resorting to a non-standard version of Chicken under incomplete information that interprets “death” as infinitely bad, we provide an explanation for important and hitherto unaccounted for claims by Hobbes. We suggest that rational choice in Hobbesian political philosophy ought to examine not so much the mechanics of rational action in natural conditions, but rather the means whereby citizens already living in civil associations can be persuaded of the irrationality of civil war.
"Mixed Duopoly, Inefficiency, and Public Ownership" (with Ken George), Review of Industrial Organization, 1996 (11), pp. 853-860.
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Abstract: If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm’s marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is “small”.
"Research vs. Development: optimal patenting policy in a three-stage model", European Economic Review, 1994 (38(7)), pp. 1423-1440.
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Abstract: To produce a new product/process firms have to go through two distinct stages. Research is discontinuous and stochastic: a prototype is a success (failure) with probability p (l-p). Development is non-stochastic and continuous, quality improvements being a concave deterministic function of development inputs. The paper shows how patent policy affects market structure and welfare. Under a single-patent regime, granting patents to research prototypes is unambiguously welfare-improving, whereas under a multiple-patent regime granting protection only to developed products/processes may be more beneficial in so far as it reduces entry, which tends to be excessive under the prototype-protection regime.
"Leviathan: Revenue-Maximizer or Glory-Seeker?" (with G. Slomp), Constitutional Political Economy, 1994 (5(2)), pp. 159-172.
Abstract: We argue that the Hobbesian assumption of glory-seeking behavior, especially when applied to holders of high office, is both more realistic and has greater predictive power than Brennan and Buchanan's hypothesis of revenue-maximization. Whereas traditional public finance theory sees the sovereign as a benign agent without an objective of his own and Brennan and Buchanan endow him with the objective of revenue maximization, Hobbes's political construct envisages a sovereign-principal who devises rules and incentives to induce his subjects-agents to contribute to his own preservation and glory. We examine the implications of this Copernican revolution in public finance theory by referring to Brennan and Buchanan's key claim that the Leviathan ought to be constrained by a fiscal constitution. We argue that the interplay of the pursuit of glory and the concern for self-preservation implies that the government cannot be bound by rules set by citizens. |
"Asymmetric Oligopoly and Technology Transfers", Economic Journal, 1993 (103), pp. 436-443
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"Optimal Patent Life Vs Optimal Patentability Standards", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1992 (10(1)), pp. 81-89
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Abstract: This note considers a new dimension in optimal patent design by treating strategic roles as a policy instrument. It is shown that, contrary to established wisdom, welfare is not always maximized when the Patent Office optimizes over patent life and plays the role of Stackelberg leader. When innovations are not ‘difficult’, leadership is irrelevant and setting a (high) minimum patentability standard is more valuable than setting patent life.
"The 1988 EC Directive on biotechnological inventions and the British biotechnology industry", International Review of Applied Economics, 1989 (6(3)), pp. 329-343.
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Abstract: The
article, based on a recent survey of UK biotechnology companies, highlights the
complex interaction between the organization of R&D and the patenting
policy in the biotech industry. Some of the more interesting findings include:
the limited extent of private investment in biotechnological R&D; the
existence of two markedly different R&D strategies (product- vs.
process-based); the distinction between first- and second-generation patents
and their effects on market structure. The core of the article deals with the
likely effects on patenting behaviour of changes in patent law - both as
envisaged in the October 1988 Directive and as suggested by recent theoretical
research on the economics of patents. The Directive in its current form is
reported to have no discernible effect on the extent and organization of
R&D, whereas the industry's response to a series of hypothetical changes
suggests that any definition or patentability standards has far-reaching
repercussions on: (1) the allocation of resources between research and
development; (2) the conditions of entry into the industry; (3) the balance of
bargaining power between firms of unequal size (or pursuing different R&D
strategies); and ultimately (4) the allocation of technological surplus between
consumers and producers.
"The case for permissive patents" (with R. MacLeod and D. De Meza), European Economic Review, 1989 (33(7)), pp. 1427-43
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Abstract: Whatever its shortcomings in practice, until very recently patent law has sought to embody the winner-takes-all principle. This paper argues that it is both feasible and desirable lo allow multiple prizes. Indeed, it is possible that complete abolition of the patent system, by raising the returns to late finishers, would yield an improvement on the current situation.
"Why are profits correlated with concentration?" Economics Letters, 1986 (22(1)), pp. 81-85.
Abstract: In a free-entry non-cooperative oligopoly a correlation between profitability and concentration arises from the indivisibility of firms, Although a ‘perverse’ negative correlation is possible, most distributions of entry fees across industries yield a positive correlation. |